Psychological and psychoanalytic criticism
(From- A Glossary of Literary Terms- M. H. Abrams)
Psychological criticism deals
with a work of literature primarily as an expression, in an indirect and fictional
form, of the state of mind and the structure of personality of the individual author.
This approach emerged in the early decades of the nineteenth century, as part of
the romantic replacement of earlier mimetic and pragmatic views by an expressive
view of the nature of literature; see criticism. By 1827 Thomas Carlyle could say
that the usual question “with the best of our own critics at present” is one “mainly
of a psychological sort, to be answered by discovering and delineating the peculiar
nature of the poet from his poetry.” During the Romantic Period, we find widely
practiced all three types of the critical procedures (still current today) that are
based on the assumption that the details and form of a work of literature are correlated
with its author’s distinctive mental and emotional traits: (1) reference to
the author’s personality in order to explain and int
experience the distinctive subjectivity, or consciousness, of its author (see critics of
consciousness). We even find that John Keble, in a series of Latin lectures On the
Healing Power of Poetry—published in 1844, but delivered more than ten years earlier—proposed
a thoroughgoing proto-Freudian literary theory. “Poetry,” Keble
claimed, “is the indirect expression . . . of some overpowering emotion, or ruling
taste, or feeling, the direct indulgence whereof is somehow repressed”; this repression
is imposed by the author’s sentiments of “reticence” and “shame”; the conflict
between the need for expression and the compulsion to repress such selfrevelation
is resolved by the poet’s ability to give “healing relief to secret mental
emotion, yet without detriment to modest reserve” by a literary “art which under
certain veils and disguises . . . reveals the fervent emotions of the mind”; and this
disguised mode of self-expression serves as “a safety valve, preserving men from
madness.” (The emergence and the varieties of romantic psychological criticism
are described in M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, 1953, chapters 6 and
9.) In the present era many critics make at least passing references to the psychology
of an author in discussing works of literature, with the notable exception of
those whose critical premises invalidate such reference; mainly proponents of formalism,
New Criticism, structuralism, deconstruction.
Since the 1920s, a widespread form of psychological literary criticism has
come to be psychoanalytic criticism, whose premises and procedures were established
by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). Freud had developed the dynamic form
of psychology that he called “psychoanalysis” as a procedure for the analysis and
therapy of neuroses, but soon expanded it to account for many developments and
practices in the history of civilization, including warfare, mythology, and religion,
as well as literature and the other arts. Freud’s brief comment on the workings of
the artist’s imagination at the end of the twenty-third lecture of his Introduction to
Psychoanalysis (1920), supplemented by relevant passages in the other lectures in
that book, set forth the theoretical framework of what is sometimes called “classical”
psychoanalytic criticism. Freud proposes that literature and the other arts, like
dreams and neurotic symptoms, consist of the imagined, or fantasied, fulfillment of
wishes that are either denied by reality or are prohibited by the social standards of
morality and propriety. The forbidden, mainly sexual (“libidinal”) wishes come
into conflict with the “censor” (the internalized representative within each individual
of a society’s standards of morality and propriety) and are repressed by the
censor into the unconscious realm of the artist’s mind, but are permitted to
achieve a fantasied satisfaction in distorted forms that serve to disguise their real
motives and objects from the conscious mind. The chief mechanisms that effect
these disguises of unconscious wishes are (1) “condensation” (the omission of parts
of the unconscious material and the fusion of several unconscious elements into a
single entity); (2) “displacement” (the substitution for an unconscious object of
desire by one that is acceptable to the conscious mind); and (3) “symbolism”
(the representation of repressed, mainly sexual, objects of desire by nonsexual objects
which resemble them or are associated with them in prior experience). The
disguised fantasies that are evident to consciousness are called by Freud the manifest
content of a dream or work of literature; the unconscious wishes that find a
semblance of satisfaction in this distorted form he calls the latent content. Also present in the unconscious of every individual, according to Freud, are
residual traces of prior stages of psychosexual development, from earliest infancy
onward, which have been outgrown, but remain as “fixations” in the unconscious
of the adult. When triggered by some later event in adult life, a repressed wish is
revived and motivates a fantasy, in disguised form, of a satisfaction that is modeled
on the way that the wish had been gratified in infancy or early childhood. The
chief enterprise of the psychoanalytic critic, in a way that parallels the enterprise
of the psychoanalyst as a therapist, is to decipher the true content, and thereby to
explain the emotional effects on the reader, of a literary work by translating its
manifest elements into the latent, unconscious determinants that constitute their
real but suppressed meanings.
Freud also asserts, however, that artists possess special abilities that differentiate
them radically from the patently neurotic personality. The artistic person, for example,
possesses to an especially high degree the power to sublimate (that is, to
shift the instinctual drives from their original sexual goals to nonsexual “higher”
goals, including the discipline of becoming proficient as an artist); the ability to
elaborate fantasied wish fulfillments into the manifest features of a work of art in
a way that conceals or deletes their merely personal elements, and so makes them
capable of satisfying the unconscious desires of people other than the individual
artist; and the “puzzling” ability—which Freud elsewhere says is a power of “genius”
that psychoanalysis cannot explain—to mold an artistic medium into “a
faithful image of the creatures of his imagination,” as well as into a satisfying artistic
form. The result is a fantasied wish fulfillment of a complex and artfully shaped
sort that not only allows the artist to overcome, at least partially and temporarily,
personal conflicts and repressions, but also makes it possible for the artist’s audience
“to obtain solace and consolation from their own unconscious sources of
gratification which had become inaccessible” to them. Literature and art, therefore,
unlike dreams and neuroses, may serve the artist as a mode of fantasy that
opens “the way back to reality.”
This outline of Freud’s theory of art in 1920 was elaborated and refined, but
not radically altered, by the later developments in his theory of mental structures,
dynamics, and processes. Prominent among these developments was Freud’s
model of the mind as having three functional aspects: the id (which incorporates
libidinal and other desires), the superego (the internalization of social standards of
morality and propriety), and the ego (which tries as best it can to negotiate the
conflicts between the insatiable demands of the id, the impossibly stringent requirements
of the superego, and the limited possibilities of gratification offered
by reality). Freud has himself summarized for a general audience his later theoretical
innovations, with his remarkable power for clear and dramatic exposition, in
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933) and An Outline of Psychoanalysis
(1939).
Freud asserted that many of his views had been anticipated by insightful
authors in Western literature, and he himself applied psychoanalysis to brief discussions
of the latent content in the manifest characters or events of literary works
including Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Macbeth, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and King
Lear. He also wrote a brilliant analysis of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov and a full-length study, Delusion and Dream (1917), of the novel Gradiva
by the Danish writer Wilhelm Jensen. Especially after the 1930s, a number of writers
produced critical analyses, modeled on classical Freudian theory, of the lives of
authors and of the content of their literary works. One of the best-known books
in this mode is Hamlet and Oedipus (1949) by the psychoanalyst Ernest Jones.
Building on earlier suggestions by Freud himself, Jones explained Hamlet’s inability
to make up his mind to kill his uncle by reference to his Oedipus complex—
that is, the repressed but continuing presence in the adult’s unconscious of the
male infant’s desire to possess his mother and to have his rival, the father, out of
the way. (Freud derived the term from Sophocles’ Greek tragedy Oedipus the King,
whose protagonist has unknowingly killed his father and married his mother.)
Jones proposes that Hamlet’s conflict is “an echo of a similar one in Shakespeare
himself,” and goes on to account for the audience’s powerful and continued response
to the play, over many centuries, as a result of the repressed Oedipal conflict
that is shared by all men. In more recent decades there has been increasing
emphasis by Freudian critics, in a mode suggested by Freud’s later writings, on
the role of “ego psychology” in elaborating the manifest content and artistic
form of a work of literature; that is, on the way that the “ego,” in contriving
the work, consciously manages to mediate between the conflicting demands of
the id, the superego, and the limits imposed by reality. On such developments
see Frederick C. Crews, “Literature and Psychology,” in Relations of Literary
Study, ed. James Thorpe (1967), and the issue on “Psychology and Literature:
Some Contemporary Directions,” in New Literary History, Vol. 12 (1980).
Norman Holland is a leading exponent of the application of psychoanalytic concepts
not (as in most earlier criticism) to the relation of the author to the work,
but to the relation of the reader to the work, explaining each reader’s individual
response as the product of a “transactive” engagement between his or her unconscious
desires and defenses and the fantasies that the author has projected in the
literary text; see under reader-response criticism.
The term psychobiography designates an account of the life of an author
(see biography) that focuses on the subject’s psychological development, relying
for evidence both on external sources and on the author’s own writings. It stresses
the role of unconscious and disguised motives in forming the author’s personality,
and is usually written in accordance with a version, or a revision, of the Freudian
theory of the stages of psychosexual development. A major exemplar of the mode
was Erik H. Erikson’s Young Man Luther (1958), in which Erikson stressed the importance
of Luther’s adolescent “identity crisis.” Other notable instances of literary
psychobiography are Leon Edel, Henry James (5 vols., 1953–72), and Justin Kaplan,
Mark Twain and His World (1974). Prominent and diverse examples of Freudian
literary criticism can be found in the collections listed below. It should be noted,
in addition, that many modern literary critics, like many modern authors, owe
some debt to Freud; such major critics, for example, as Kenneth Burke, Edmund
Wilson, and Lionel Trilling assimilated central Freudian concepts into their overall
critical views and procedures.
Carl G. Jung is sometimes called a psychoanalyst, but although he began as a
disciple of Freud, his mature version of depth psychology is very different from that of his predecessor, and what we call Jungian criticism of literature departs
radically from psychoanalytic criticism. Jung’s emphasis is not on the individual
unconscious, but on what he calls the “collective unconscious,” shared by all individuals
in all cultures, which he regards as the repository of “racial memories”
and of primordial images and patterns of experience that he calls archetypes. He
does not, like Freud, view literature as a disguised form of libidinal wish fulfillment
that to a large extent parallels the fantasies of a neurotic personality.
Instead, Jung regards great literature as, like the myths whose patterns recur in diverse
cultures, an expression of the archetypes of the collective racial unconscious.
A great author possesses, and provides for readers, access to the archetypal images
buried in the racial memory, and so succeeds in revitalizing aspects of the psyche
which are essential both to individual self-integration and to the mental and emotional
well-being of the human race. Jung’s theory of literature has been a cardinal
formative influence on archetypal criticism and myth criticism. See Jung, Contributions
to Analytic Psychology (1928) and Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933); also
Edward Glover, Freud or Jung (1950).
Since the development of structural and poststructural theories, there has been a
strong revival of Freudian theories, although in diverse reformulations of the classical
Freudian scheme. Close attention to Freud’s writings, and frequently the assimilation
of some version of Freud’s ideas to their own views and procedures, are
features of the criticism of many current writers, whether they are Marxist,
Foucauldian, or Derridean in theoretical commitment or primary focus. Harold
Bloom’s theory of the anxiety of influence specifically adapts to the composition
and reading of poetry Freud’s concepts of the Oedipus complex and of the distorting
operation of defense mechanisms in dreams. A number of feminist critics
have attacked the male-centered nature of Freud’s theory—especially evident in
such crucial conceptions as the Oedipus complex and “penis envy” on the part
of the female child; but many feminists have also adapted a revised version of
Freudian concepts and mental mechanisms to their analyses of the writing and
reading of literary texts. See Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1975);
Mary Jacobus, Reading Woman (1986); Nancy Chodorow, Feminism and
Psychoanalytic Theory (1990); Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Freud on Women: A Reader
(1992); Rosalind Minsky, ed., Psychoanalysis and Gender: An Introductory Reader
(1996).
Jacques Lacan, “the French Freud,” developed a semiotic version of Freud,
converting the basic concepts of psychoanalysis into formulations derived from
the linguistic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure, and applying these concepts not
to the mental processes of human individuals, but to the operations of the process
of signification. (See under linguistics in literary criticism.) Typical is Lacan’s oftquoted
dictum, “The unconscious is structured like a language.” His procedure
is to recast Freud’s key concepts and mechanisms into the linguistic mode, viewing
the human mind not as pre-existent to, but as constituted by, the language we
use. In Lacan’s revision, for example, both gender and desire are not producers, but
products of the signifying system. Especially important in Lacanian literary criticism
is Lacan’s reformulation of Freud’s concepts of the early stages of psychosexual
development and the formation of the Oedipus complex into the distinction between a prelinguistic stage of development that he calls the imaginary
and the stage after the acquisition of language that he calls the symbolic. In
the imaginary stage, there is no clear distinction between the subject and an object,
or between the individual self and other selves. Intervening between these
two stages is what Lacan calls the mirror stage, the moment when the infant
learns to identify with his or her image in a mirror, and so begins to develop a
sense of a separate self, and an (illusory) understanding of oneself as an autonomous
subject, that is later enhanced by what is reflected back to it from encounters
with other people. When it enters the symbolic, or linguistic, stage, the infant
subject assimilates the inherited system of linguistic differences, hence is constituted
by the symbolic, as it learns to accept its predetermined “position” in such
linguistic oppositions as male/female, father/son, mother/daughter. This symbolic
realm of language, in Lacan’s theory, is the realm of the law of the father, in
which the “phallus” (used in a symbolic sense to stand for male privilege and authority)
is “the privileged signifier” that serves to establish the mode for all other
signifiers. In a parallel fashion, Lacan translates Freud’s views of the mental workings
of dream formation into textual terms of the play of signifiers, converting
Freud’s distorting defense mechanisms into linguistic figures of speech. And according
to Lacan, all processes of linguistic expression and interpretation, driven
by “desire” for a lost and unachievable object, move incessantly (as in Derrida’s
theory of deconstruction) along a chain of unstable signifiers, without any possibility
of coming to rest on a fixed signified, or presence. (See Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A
Selection, 1977; The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1998; and The
Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–60, 1997. See also
Lacan’s much discussed reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s short story The Purloined
Letter as an allegory of the workings of the linguistic signifier, in Yale French
Studies, Vol. 48, 1972; and Malcolm Bowie, Lacan, 1991.) Lacan’s notions of the
inalienable split, or “difference,” that inhabits the self, and of the endless chain of
displacements in the quest for meaning, have made him a prominent reference in
poststructural theorists. And his distinction between the pre-Oedipal, maternal stage
of the prelinguistic imaginary and the “phallocentric” stage of symbolic language
has been exploited at length by a number of French feminists; see Hélène Cixous,
Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva under feminist criticism.
See Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Freud (1991). Many of
Freud’s psychoanalytic writings on literature and the arts have been collected by
Benjamin Nelson, ed., Sigmund Freud on Creativity and the Unconscious (1958).
Anthologies of psychoanalytic criticism by various authors are William Phillips,
ed., Art and Psychoanalysis (1957), and Leonard and Eleanor Manheim, eds.,
Hidden Patterns: Studies in Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism (1966). Useful discussions
and developments of Freudian literary theory are Frederick J. Hoffman,
Freudianism and the Literary Mind (rev. 1957), which also describes Freud’s wide
influence on writers and critics; Norman N. Holland, Holland’s Guide to
Psychoanalytic Psychology and Literature-and-Psychology (1990); and Peter Brooks,
Psychoanalysis and Storytelling (1994). Elizabeth Wright, Psychoanalytic Criticism:
Theory in Practice (1984), reviews various developments in psychoanalytic theories
and their applications to literary criticism. For two major traditional critics who have to an important extent adapted Freudian concepts to their general enterprise,
see Edmund Wilson, The Wound and the Bow (1941), and Lionel Trilling, “Freud
and Literature,” in The Liberal Imagination (1950). Frederick C. Crews, who in
1966 wrote an exemplary Freudian critical study, The Sins of the Fathers:
Hawthorne’s Psychological Themes, later retracted his Freudian commitment; see his
Skeptical Engagements (1986). For feminist views and adaptations of Jacques Lacan,
see Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (1985); Shoshana Felman, Jacques Lacan and the
Adventure of Insight (1987); and Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist
Introduction (1990). In recent years Slavoj Žižek has argued for the primacy of
Lacan as an ethical and political thinker. See The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989)
and Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture (1991).
Every attempt that has hitherto been made to solve the problem of dream: has dealt directly with their manifest content as it is presented in our memory. All such attempts have endeavoured to arrive at an interpretation of dreams from their manifest content or (if no interpretation was attempted to form a judgement as to their nature on the basis of that same manifest content. We are alone in taking something else into account. We have introduced a new class of psychical material between the manifest content 01 dreams and the conclusions of our enquiry: namely, their latent content, 01 (as we say) the 'dream-thoughts', arrived at by means of our procedure. It i! from these dream-thoughts and not from a dream's manifest content that we disentangle its meaning. We are thus presented with a new task which had no previous existence: the task, that is, of investigating the relation between the manifest content of dreams and the latent dream-thoughts, and of tracing out the processes by which the latter have been changed into the former. The dream~thoughts and the dream-content are presented to us like two versions of the same subject-matter in two different languages. Or, more properly, the dream-content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression,' whose characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation. The dream-thoughts are immediately comprehensible, as soon as we have learnt them. The dream-content, on the other hand, is expressed as it were in a pictographic script, the characters of which have to be transposed individually into the language of the dream-thoughts. If we attempted to read these characters according to their pictorial ,value instead of according to their symbolic relation, we should clearly be led into error. Suppose I have a picture-puzzle, a rebus, in front of me. It depicts a house with a boat on its roof, a single letter of the alphabet, the figure of a running man whose head has been conjured away, and so on. Now I might be misled into raising objections and declaring that the picture as a whole and its component parts are nonsensical. A boat has no business to be on the roof of a house, and a headless man cannot run. Moreover, the man is bigger than the house; and if the whole picture is intended to represent a landscape, letters of the alphabet are out of place in it since such objects do not occur in nature. But obviously we can only form a proper judgement of the rebus if we put aside criticisms such as these of the whole composition and its parts and if, instead, we try to replace each separate element by a syllable or word that can be represented by that element in some way or other. The words which are put together in this way are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest beauty and significance. A dream is a picture-puzzle of this sort and our predecessors in the field of dream-interpretation have made the mistake of treating the' rebus as a pictorial composition: and as such it has seemed to them nonsensical and worthless.
.....................
The nightly formation of dreams, or the dream-work in Freudian terminology, involves the censorship of unconscious wishes (frequently sexual) that undergo four kinds of deliberate, positive distortion on their way to consciousness: condensation, displacement, symbolization, and secondary revision or elaboration. These unconscious processes explain why dreams usually emerge as garbled "nonsense." The task of the psychoanalyst is, with the help of the patient, to make sense of dream texts. Here, psychoanalysis asserts that nonsense is meaningful and that ·distortion is inescapable and creative. Both assertions are taken seriously by many 'critics and theorists as they work to understand texts, especially since literary discourses 'are, often as seemingly nonsensical and distorted as dreams Psychoanalytic decoding of symbols has proved particularly illuminating to critics, notably those followers of Carl Jung who have made' inventories of archetypes-universal symbols such as the garden and the desert, water and fire, the hero and the monster, the river journey and the ordeal, birth and death-that they believe are stored in humanity's collective unconscious.
Sigmund Freud
From Chapter VI. The Dream-Work
Every attempt that has hitherto been made to solve the problem of dream: has dealt directly with their manifest content as it is presented in our memory. All such attempts have endeavoured to arrive at an interpretation of dreams from their manifest content or (if no interpretation was attempted to form a judgement as to their nature on the basis of that same manifest content. We are alone in taking something else into account. We have introduced a new class of psychical material between the manifest content 01 dreams and the conclusions of our enquiry: namely, their latent content, 01 (as we say) the 'dream-thoughts', arrived at by means of our procedure. It i! from these dream-thoughts and not from a dream's manifest content that we disentangle its meaning. We are thus presented with a new task which had no previous existence: the task, that is, of investigating the relation between the manifest content of dreams and the latent dream-thoughts, and of tracing out the processes by which the latter have been changed into the former. The dream~thoughts and the dream-content are presented to us like two versions of the same subject-matter in two different languages. Or, more properly, the dream-content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression,' whose characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation. The dream-thoughts are immediately comprehensible, as soon as we have learnt them. The dream-content, on the other hand, is expressed as it were in a pictographic script, the characters of which have to be transposed individually into the language of the dream-thoughts. If we attempted to read these characters according to their pictorial ,value instead of according to their symbolic relation, we should clearly be led into error. Suppose I have a picture-puzzle, a rebus, in front of me. It depicts a house with a boat on its roof, a single letter of the alphabet, the figure of a running man whose head has been conjured away, and so on. Now I might be misled into raising objections and declaring that the picture as a whole and its component parts are nonsensical. A boat has no business to be on the roof of a house, and a headless man cannot run. Moreover, the man is bigger than the house; and if the whole picture is intended to represent a landscape, letters of the alphabet are out of place in it since such objects do not occur in nature. But obviously we can only form a proper judgement of the rebus if we put aside criticisms such as these of the whole composition and its parts and if, instead, we try to replace each separate element by a syllable or word that can be represented by that element in some way or other. The words which are put together in this way are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest beauty and significance. A dream is a picture-puzzle of this sort and our predecessors in the field of dream-interpretation have made the mistake of treating the' rebus as a pictorial composition: and as such it has seemed to them nonsensical and worthless.
.....................
The nightly formation of dreams, or the dream-work in Freudian terminology, involves the censorship of unconscious wishes (frequently sexual) that undergo four kinds of deliberate, positive distortion on their way to consciousness: condensation, displacement, symbolization, and secondary revision or elaboration. These unconscious processes explain why dreams usually emerge as garbled "nonsense." The task of the psychoanalyst is, with the help of the patient, to make sense of dream texts. Here, psychoanalysis asserts that nonsense is meaningful and that ·distortion is inescapable and creative. Both assertions are taken seriously by many 'critics and theorists as they work to understand texts, especially since literary discourses 'are, often as seemingly nonsensical and distorted as dreams Psychoanalytic decoding of symbols has proved particularly illuminating to critics, notably those followers of Carl Jung who have made' inventories of archetypes-universal symbols such as the garden and the desert, water and fire, the hero and the monster, the river journey and the ordeal, birth and death-that they believe are stored in humanity's collective unconscious.
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